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THE LIFE AND PREMATURE DEATH OF 
BABS: A PROPOSAL TO REINSTATE THE 
SUBSIDIZED TAXABLE MUNICIPAL BOND 
INTRODUCTION 
Amidst severe contraction in the credit markets following the subprime 
mortgage crisis, state and local governments had trouble raising capital 
needed to fund public services, payrolls, infrastructure demands, and other 
public projects.1 Further exasperating their condition, state and local 
governments’ access to the municipal bond market—often used to fund 
both long-term and short-term capital needs2—began to slip away as a 
confluence of factors stemming from the mortgage-backed security crisis3 
and lack of direct federal aid eroded investors’ confidence in the safety of 
municipal bonds.4 Thus, despite the appeal of municipal bonds to certain 
types of investors—an appeal largely created by federal tax exemptions for 
interest earned on most municipal bonds5—the municipal bond market 
failed to generate sufficient capital to meet state and local governments’ 
needs.6 Recognizing that, among other things, widespread state and 
municipal defaults could have a potentially catastrophic impact on the U.S. 
economy,7 the federal government enacted the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act of 2009, which included the Build America Bonds 
program.8 
Build America Bonds (BABs) helped assuage municipalities’ mounting 
capital needs by increasing their access to the credit markets.9 Subject to 
federal income tax but federally subsidized in the amount of 35 percent of 
the issuer’s interest costs, BABs10 broadened the municipal bond investor 
pool by appealing to tax-indifferent investors11 while simultaneously 
                                                                                                                 
 1. See Mary William Walsh, Cities Are Cutting Back Projects, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2008, at 
A1; see also Philip Shishkin, States Cut Services for Elderly, Disabled —- As Budget Shortfalls 
Force Reductions in Home Care, Low-Income People May Face Nursing Homes, Advocates Say, 
WALL ST. J., Nov. 20, 2008, at D1. 
 2. Randle Pollard, Who’s Going to Pick Up the Trash?-Using the Build America Bond 
Program to Help State and Local Governments’ Cash Deficits, 8 PITT. TAX REV. 171, 182–83 
(2011). 
 3. See id. at 173, 191–92; see generally infra Part I.B. 
 4. See, e.g., Tara Bernard, Reassessing Safety of Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2008, at B1; 
see generally THIERRY PAULAIS, LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND THE FINANCIAL CRISIS: AN 
ANALYSIS 5–6 (2009).  
 5. See 26 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2010). 
 6. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 172–73.  
 7. See H.R. REP. NO. 111-16, at 2 (2009) (Conf. Rep.). 
 8. See American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-5, § 1531(a), 123 
Stat. 115, 358 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 54AA) [hereinafter ARRA of 2009]. 
 9. See U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, TREASURY ANALYSIS OF BUILD AMERICA BONDS ISSUANCE 
AND SAVINGS 3 (2011) [hereinafter TREASURY ANALYSIS]. 
 10. 26 U.S.C. § 54AA(b) (2009). 
 11. Lynn Hume, Bond Lawyers: BABs May Have Permanent Effect on Tax-Exempts, Expert 
Says, THE BOND BUYER, Oct. 1, 2009, at 5. 
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reducing borrowing costs for states12 and providing attractive returns for 
investors.13 Widely considered a success,14 the BAB program helped state 
and local governments raise capital, create jobs, and save money, while 
benefitting a wider range of investors and strengthening the municipal bond 
market as a whole.15 
Since the BAB program’s expiration in December 2010, many 
commentators have advocated making BABs a permanent fixture of the 
federal tax code.16 One notable advocate is President Barak Obama, who 
championed the program’s renewal in his budget proposals for fiscal years 
2011, 2012, and 2013.17 President Obama’s BAB proposals would expand 
the bonds’ eligible uses and would set the subsidy rate at 28 percent.18 Yet, 
commentators on and off Capitol Hill have attacked the President’s 
proposals, citing fears that BABs would be used to perpetuate unsustainable 
state spending,19 will unduly burden federal taxpayers,20 or might 
completely replace traditional tax-exempt bonds.21 Others support the idea 
of taxable bonds, but would limit President Obama’s proposal by changing 
the subsidy rate, placing caps on BAB issuance, limiting the types of 
activities that may be funded by BABs, and/or using taxable bonds to 
                                                                                                                 
 12. By reducing issuers’ debt servicing costs, the subsidy allows issuers to offer more 
competitive interest rates to investors. See generally Part II. 
 13. Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: How Long Will the Tax Break on Municipal Bonds 
Last?, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2011, at B1, available at http://online.wsj.com/article/SB1000142 
4052748704810504576307233579693982.html. See also infra Part II.B. 
 14. See, e.g., David Wessel, A Stimulus Plan Success Story, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2010, at A2; 
see also Steven Gandel, A Stimulus Success: Build America Bonds Are Working, TIME (Nov. 17, 
2009), http://www.time.com/time/business/article/0,8599,1939720,00.html. 
 15. See The Reviews Are In: States, Cities Hail Build America Bonds Program, U.S. DEP’T OF 
THE TREASURY (June 2010), http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/recovery/Documents/Build 
%20America%20Bonds%20Reviews%20-%20FINAL,%2006-10-10.pdf [hereinafter TREASURY 
NEWSLETTER]; see also TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 4.  
 16. See generally infra Part III.C. 
 17. For President Obama’s budget proposal for fiscal year 2013, see DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, 
GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2013 REVENUE PROPOSALS 
11–12 (Feb. 2012) [hereinafter FY2013 EXPLANATIONS], available at http://www.treasury.gov 
/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2013.pdf. For President Obama’s 
budget proposal for fiscal year 2012, see DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF 
THE ADMINISTRATION’S FISCAL YEAR 2012 REVENUE PROPOSALS 20–21 (Feb. 2011) [hereinafter 
FY2012 EXPLANATIONS], available at http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy 
/Documents/General-Explanations-FY2012.pdf. 
 18. See FY2013 EXPLANATIONS, supra note 17, at 11–12. See also infra Part III.C. 
 19. See Steven Malanga, Letter to the Editor, The ‘Build America’ Debt Bomb, WALL ST. J., 
Nov. 22, 2010, at A19; Eric Stewart, Letter to the Editor, Can BABs Be a Real Growth-Producing 
Sweetheart?, WALL ST. J., Nov. 30, 2010, at A18. 
 20. See Sen. Chuck Grassley, Grassley: Build America Bonds Program Keeps Getting Richer 
for Wall Street, Harder on Taxpayers (Mar. 16, 2010), http://grassley.senate.gov/news/Article.cfm 
?customel_dataPageID_1502=25758 (noting in his floor speech that BABs are a costly program 
that ultimately lines Wall Street pockets through underwriting fees). 
 21. See PETER G. KESSENICH, MUNICIPAL MARKET UPDATE 37–48 (2011), available at 
http://aysps.gsu.edu/images/LTDebt1045PK.pptx (suggesting that tax-credit bonds should not 
replace tax-exempt bonds). 
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completely replace tax-exempt municipal bonds.22 From this, one would be 
amiss to conclude that change is not in the air surrounding the municipal 
bond market. But while the path remains unclear, the goal seems crystal: 
creating an efficient, equitable, and stable municipal bond market for the 
benefit of state and local governments and their citizens. 
To be efficient, federal tax expenditures should achieve their political or 
fiscal objectives directly, without spending money or forgoing taxes in 
ways that do not optimally further those goals.23 Toward that end, 
subsidized taxable bonds go a long way. Subsidized taxable municipal 
bonds achieve greater efficiency by providing a direct subsidy to the 
municipal issuer, thereby eliminating the inefficient and inequitable 
“windfall” that investors in the upper tax brackets receive through investing 
in tax-exempt municipal bonds.24 Furthermore, by broadening the investor 
base, taxable bonds reduce market volatility by relieving demand pressures 
in the municipal bond market.25 Nevertheless, lawmakers must tread 
carefully when limiting municipal bonds’ tax-exempt status, because such 
limitations might upset constitutional principles of state sovereign 
immunity.26 With these objectives in mind, it becomes clear that 
supplementing the traditional tax-exempt municipal bond market with 
subsidized taxable municipal bonds best provides the means for attaining 
these goals. 
This note proposes that creating a subsidized taxable municipal bond 
program to supplement traditional tax-exempt bonds, much like President 
Obama’s proposal for fiscal year 2013, best provides for an efficient, 
equitable, and stable municipal bond market by broadening the investor 
pool, mitigating the windfall to investors in high tax brackets, expanding 
taxable municipal bonds’ uses, and respecting the integrity of state 
sovereignty. 
Part I provides a brief overview of the municipal bond market, focusing 
on the traditional tax-exempt municipal bond and the problems it faced in 
the wake of the subprime mortgage crisis. Part II examines BABs, as 
enacted in the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, by 
briefly describing how the program works—on paper and in practice—and 
the underlying policy rationales that contributed greatly to its success. Part 
III surveys private investment strategies, issuer conduct, and legislative 
proposals in the wake of the BAB program’s expiration in 2010. Part IV 
analyzes the various legislative proposals with an eye towards creating an 
efficient, equitable, stable, and constitutionally sound municipal bond 
market. Finally, I conclude that a program similar to President Obama’s 
                                                                                                                 
 22. See infra Part III.C. 
 23. See generally infra Part IV.A. 
 24. See infra Parts IV.A and IV.B. 
 25. See infra Part IV.C. 
 26. See infra Part IV.D. 
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proposal for fiscal year 2013 would best facilitate optimal municipal bond 
market conditions, benefitting both federal fiscal policy and state and local 
economies. 
I. THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET 
So that the reader may better understand this note’s proposal, this 
section provides a brief overview of the municipal bond market’s objectives 
and structure, the basic types of securities offered by issuers, and the typical 
purchasers of those securities in order to give context to analysis in this 
note’s subsequent sections. Additionally, to put the municipal bond system 
in today’s perspective, this section will briefly examine the subprime 
mortgage crisis’s impact on the municipal bond market. 
A. THE IMPORTANCE, STRUCTURE AND TAX CONSEQUENCES OF 
THE MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET 
State and local governments27 provide essential services for their 
citizens, such as schools, hospitals, highways, parks, utilities, police, 
firefighters, judicial services, community development, and other projects 
related to the public welfare.28 Municipal governments fund these 
expenditures29 primarily through taxes,30 though they also rely on 
government aid, insurance trust revenue, and other sources of revenue such 
as tolls and license fees.31 Yet, because municipal governments must create 
annual budgets in anticipation of isolated or erratic periods of tax revenue, 
the mismatch between projected periodic revenue and ongoing—and at 
times unexpected—expenses creates a systemic need for alternative sources 
of capital.32 To fill these gaps in revenue and expenditure requirements, 
municipal governments raise money in the capital markets by issuing 
municipal bonds.33 
A municipal bond is a type of interest-bearing debt instrument issued 
by state or local governments to fund certain types of financial needs.34 
                                                                                                                 
 27. State and local governments will be referred to collectively as “municipal governments” 
throughout the remainder of this note. 
 28. See U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, STATE AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT FINANCES SUMMARY: 2008, 
at 3–4, 10–11 (2011) [hereinafter CENSUS FINANCE SUMMARY 2008], available at http://www 
.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/g08-alfin.pdf.  
 29. Such expenditures can be substantial in amount. According to the 2008 census, municipal 
governments spent $826.1 billion on education alone. Id. at 1. 
 30. In 2008, taxes amounted to about one-half of municipal government revenue, with sales 
and property taxes constituting about 65 percent of all tax revenue. Id. at 2.  
 31. Id. at 3, 6.  
 32. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 171–72 (discussing state and local governments’ systemic 
temporary cash flow deficits).  
 33. See id. 
 34. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 76 (3d pocket ed. 2006). 
2012] The Life and Premature Death of BABs 677 
Traditionally understood as constitutionally exempt from federal taxation,35 
the Internal Revenue Code exempts interest on municipal bonds from 
federal income tax36 as long as the bonds’ revenue and debt servicing are 
sufficiently unrelated to nongovernmental private business.37 While there 
are many types of municipal debt instruments, general obligation bonds and 
revenue bonds comprise the two most common tax-exempt municipal 
bonds.38 For general obligation bonds, the issuer’s full faith and credit 
secures its debt servicing obligations, while specific pools or sources of 
revenue secure the issuer’s debt servicing obligations for revenue bonds.39 
The vast majority of outstanding municipal bonds are tax exempt.40 
By exempting interest on municipal bonds from federal income tax, 
Congress reduces municipalities’ costs of raising money for governmental 
projects by increasing the bond’s after-tax yield.41 Thus, if the municipal 
issuer sets the bond’s interest rate so that its yield is comparable to the 
after-tax yield on a taxable bond of similar risk and qualities, the 
municipality can offer lower interest rates than a comparable taxable bond 
without reducing the bond’s value to the investor because the bond 
purchaser will earn the same amount of interest on either bond.42 To 
illustrate, an investor with a marginal tax rate of 30 percent would be as 
willing to purchase a $1,000 taxable bond carrying a 7 percent interest rate 
as he would a $1,000 tax-exempt bond carrying a 4.9 percent interest rate.43 
Here, the investor would earn $49 in interest by purchasing either bond at 
                                                                                                                 
 35. See Pollock v. Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 158 U.S. 601 (1895) (invalidating federal tax 
on municipal bonds as repugnant to the Constitution because such a tax interferes with states’ 
sovereign power to raise money). 
 36. Subject to certain exceptions discussed infra note 37, “gross income does not include 
interest on any State or local bond.” I.R.C. § 103(a) (2012); but see U.S. CONST. amend. XVI 
(“The Congress shall have the power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source 
derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or 
enumeration.”). Yet, ultimately persuaded by U.S. Supreme Court cases like Pollock v. Farmer’s 
Loan & Trust Co., Congress believed that interest on municipal bonds should be tax free and 
enacted § 103 of the Internal Revenue Code. See Patrick Manchester, Note, Be Kind to Your 
Foreign Investor Friends, 98 GEO. L.J. 1823, 1829 (2010). 
 37. Under I.R.C. § 103(b), the federal tax exemption provided in § 103(a) does not apply to: 
(1) private activity bonds that are not qualified; (2) arbitrage bonds; or (3) bonds in unregistered 
form. I.R.C. § 103(b). Unqualified private activity bonds, as defined in § 103(b), are municipal 
bonds where more than 10 percent of the issuer’s proceeds are used for any nongovernmental 
private business use and more than 10 percent of either payment or security for debt services are 
derived from such private business or its property. Id. § 141(a)–(c). 
 38. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 178. 
 39. Because general obligation bonds are effectively secured by all revenue potentially 
attainable though the municipal government’s taxing powers, while revenue bonds are secured 
only by specific pools of resources, investors typically demand higher interest rates for revenue 
bonds to account for those bonds’ increased risk of default. See id. at 178–79.  
 40. See id. at 180. 
 41. See id. 
 42. See id. 
 43. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAX-CREDIT BONDS AND THE FEDERAL COST OF FINANCING 
PUBLIC EXPENDITURES 4 (2004) [hereinafter 2004 CBO REPORT]. 
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par value because the investor’s $70 pre-tax earnings on the taxable bond 
will be reduced by $21 (30 percent of $70) by federal income tax, resulting 
in a $49 after-tax yield.44 In effect, Congress helps municipalities pay for 
the extra amount of interest needed to attract investors interested in 
comparable taxable bonds by forgoing income taxes it could have collected 
from the municipal bond purchaser.45 By making municipal bonds less 
expensive for issuers, Congress encourages public projects, which benefits 
the general welfare in turn.46 
Excluding interest earnings on municipal bonds from gross income 
appeals to a specific category of investors—investors who would gain most 
from not paying taxes. Thus, tax-exempt municipal bonds attract investors 
with higher marginal tax rates as well as other investors that are interested 
in reducing their taxable income, such as banks, investment fund managers, 
and casualty insurance companies.47 
B. THE SUBPRIME MORTGAGE CRISIS AND ITS IMPACT ON THE 
MUNICIPAL BOND MARKET 
In 2007, after the U.S. housing market enjoyed steadily increasing real 
estate values during the beginning half of the decade, real estate values 
dropped off severely.48 Because many homes purchased during the housing 
boom were financed through subprime mortgages—mortgages targeting 
consumers with little assets and poor credit scores—the drop in home 
values caused real estate values to drop below mortgage values. This drop 
in value gave hundreds of thousands of mortgagers an incentive to enter 
into foreclosure and greatly reduced or eliminated the value of those 
mortgages.49 As subprime mortgage brokers packaged prime and subprime 
mortgages into single pools of mortgage-backed securities for resale—
making it difficult to separate subprime mortgages from prime mortgages—
entire investment pools were severely reduced in value, collapsing the 
subprime mortgage industry and greatly harming investors that purchased 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See id.  
 45. As we shall see, Congress pays more than the amount necessary to attract the marginal 
taxpayer to purchase municipal bonds without providing any extra benefit to the municipal issuer, 
resulting in an inefficient allocation of government resources. See infra Part II.B. 
 46. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 180.  
 47. See id. at 201.  
 48. AFP, Housing Woes Take Bigger Toll on Economy than Expected, Says US Treasury 
Secretary, THE DAILY STAR (Tues., Oct. 18, 2007), http://www.thedailystar.net/newDesign/news 
-details.php?nid=7828.  
 49. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 192.  
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those securities.50 As a result, many large financial institutions either filed 
for bankruptcy or suffered severe reductions in capital.51 
The subprime mortgage crisis increased municipal governments’ cost of 
raising capital in the municipal bond market for a number of reasons. First, 
and probably most apparent, uncertainty in the strength of financial markets 
caused investors to retreat from the market, thereby reducing the demand 
for municipal bonds.52 For those investors that remained, municipal issuers 
had to pay higher interest rates on their bonds to compensate investors for 
the increased amount of perceived risk. Second, the collapse of major 
financial institutions53 meant that fewer underwriters were available to 
underwrite municipal bonds, making underwriting fees more costly for 
municipal governments.54 Third, municipal bond insurers, who also insured 
many subprime mortgages, suffered major losses when mortgage defaults 
increased dramatically after the housing bubble burst.55 As a result, 
insurance rating agencies downgraded most municipal bond insurers, 
raising the cost of insurance, and thus, increasing the cost of raising capital 
through municipal bond offerings.56 Finally, municipal governments 
themselves were experiencing financial hardship from reduced property and 
income tax revenues.57 Consequently, as municipal governments entered a 
period where their own finances were stretched thin, municipalities’ access 
to the municipal bond market became increasingly difficult. 
II. BUILD AMERICA BONDS 
Congress created the BAB program to help financially strapped 
municipal governments raise capital in the years following the subprime 
mortgage crisis. To better understand the BAB program, this section 
examines how BABs work within the federal tax code, Congress’ reasons 
for enacting the program, and the program’s reception in and impact on the 
municipal bond market. 
                                                                                                                 
 50. Mara De Hovanesian & Matthew Goldstein, The Mortgage Mess Spreads, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Mar. 7, 2007, 5:11 PM), http://www.businessweek.com/investor/content 
/mar2007/pi20070307_505304.htm.  
 51. See, e.g., Dan Wilchins, Merrill Sells Off Assets from Bear Hedge Funds, REUTERS (June 
21, 2007), http://www.reuters.com/article/2007/06/21/us-bearstearns-merrilllynch-idUSN2024 
502520070621; Daniel Pimlott, H&R Block Feels Effects of Subprime Woes, 
FINANCIALTIMES.COM (June 21, 2007, 7:36 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2485fd88-1ffa-
11dc-9eb1-000b5df10621.html#axzz1oxVLVrup. 
 52. Ryan Barnes, The Fuel That Fed the Subprime Meltdown, INVESTOPEDIA.COM (Sept. 4, 
2007), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/subprime-overview.asp#axzz1bjRXywoG. 
 53. In 2008, Bank of America acquired Merrill Lynch, Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy, 
and J.P. Morgan Chase acquired a failing Washington Mutual. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 192.  
 54. See id.  
 55. See id. at 193. 
 56. See id.  
 57. See id. at 192.  
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A. BUILD AMERICA BONDS’ OPERATION IN THE INTERNAL 
REVENUE CODE 
Section 1531 of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
200958 amends Part IV of Subtitle A, Chapter 1, Subchapter A in the 
Internal Revenue Code by adding § 54AA.59 Section 54AA authorizes state 
and local governments to issue two general types of BABs,60 both subject to 
federal income tax on interest earned by the investor.61 A state or local 
government BAB issuer may choose to issue either “tax-credit” BABs62 or 
“direct payment” BABs,63 depending on its financing needs.64 
Section 54AA(b) provides that the tax credit due the holder of a “tax-
credit” BAB described above is equal to “35 percent of the amount of 
interest payable by the issuer with respect to such date,”65 net of the tax 
credit.66 Thus, in effect, the BAB issuer receives a federal tax subsidy of 
approximately 25 percent of the “tax-credit” BAB holder’s total return on 
the bond.67 Here, the issuer’s borrowing costs are not reduced by the full 35 
percent because the tax credit itself is taxed, causing the issuer to increase 
the pre-tax coupon to offset the investor’s reduced tax credit. 
In contrast, at the issuer’s irrevocable option,68 the municipal issuer 
may elect to issue “direct payment” BABs, which provide a subsidy directly 
to the BAB issuer equal to 35 percent of the total coupon interest payable to 
the BAB investor.69 However, in contrast to the 35 percent subsidy 
provided by a “tax-credit” BAB, the 35 percent credit in a “direct payment” 
BAB is not taxed, which results in a deeper subsidy to the municipal issuer 
than the “tax-credit” BAB effectively provides.70 
The tax code restricts a municipal issuer’s uses of BABs. Section 
54AA(d) provides that a BAB obligation may not be a “private activity 
                                                                                                                 
 58. ARRA of 2009 § 1531, 123 Stat. 358 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 54AA).  
 59. Id.  
 60. See I.R.C. § 54AA(a), (g) (2009).  
 61. See id. § 54AA(f)(1).  
 62. See, e.g., Notice 2009-26, INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., 2009-16 I.R.B. 801, 834 (Apr. 20, 
2009) [hereinafter IRB REPORT]; Pollard, supra note 2, at 199–200. See also CONG. BUDGET 
OFFICE JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, SUBSIDIZING INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT WITH TAX-
PREFERRED BONDS viii, 13 (Sherry Snyder ed., Oct. 2009) [hereinafter 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY] 
(describing “tax-credit” bonds generally). 
 63. See, e.g., IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. 801, 834–35; Pollard, supra note 2, at 199–200. See 
also 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 16 (describing “direct pay” bonds generally).  
 64. See generally IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B.at 833.  
 65. I.R.C. § 54AA(b).  
 66. See IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. at 834.  
 67. Id. In other words, the issuer receives a subsidy equal to 25 percent of what an issuer’s 
interest obligations would have been had that issuer offered an unsubsidized taxable bond of 
similar risk and qualities.  
 68. See I.R.C. § 54AA(g)(2)(B), 54AA(d)(1)(C).  
 69. See id. § 54AA(g)(1), (g)(2)(B), (d)(1)(C); see also id. § 6431(a), (b).  
 70. See IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. at 834 (noting that the “direct payment” BABs provide a 
“deeper” subsidy than the “tax-credit” BABs).  
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bond”71 and must be an obligation that “would (but for this section) be 
excludable from gross income under section 103 [of the I.R.C.]”72 (i.e., a 
“tax-exempt governmental bond”).73 In essence, BABs may not be used to 
finance certain projects where more than 10 percent of the proceeds are 
used for nongovernmental matters and where more than 10 percent of the 
interest payments are secured by private assets.74 Additionally, BABs 
cannot directly or indirectly finance loans to one or more nongovernmental 
persons exceeding $5 million or 5 percent of the issue proceeds.75 In 
general, “tax-credit” BABs are relatively restriction free and may be used to 
finance any project that a municipal issuer could finance through a 
traditional tax-exempt bond, including current refundings and advance 
refundings of capital and working capital expenditures.76 
In contrast to “tax-credit” BABs, “direct payment” BABs must be 
“qualified bonds” as defined in § 54AA(g) in order to receive the 35 percent 
subsidy, and hence, are more restricted in their uses. In principal part,  
§ 54AA(g)(2) requires that 100 percent of the available project proceeds,77 
divided by the amount held in a reasonably required reserve fund,78 be used 
for capital expenditures only.79 As such, “direct payment” BABs cannot be 
used for working capital expenditures or to refinance capital expenditures, 
limiting the municipal issuer’s use of the “direct payment” BAB program.80 
Finally, the BAB program spanned from April 2009 through December 
2010, when it was allowed to expire.81 During the course of its existence, no 
“tax-credit” BABs were issued, presumably due to the deeper subsidy 
offered through the “direct payment” BAB program.82 
                                                                                                                 
 71. I.R.C. § 54AA(d).  
 72. Id. § 54AA(d)(1). Section 54AA(d)(1) contains two more restrictions: (1) that the 
obligation is issued before January 1, 2011; and (2) that the issuer makes an irrevocable election to 
have § 54AA apply. See id. § 54AA(d)(1)(B), (d)(1)(C).  
 73. See IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. at 834.  
 74. See 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 11.  
 75. See id. at 12.  
 76. See id. at 11.  
 77. Available project proceeds means “the excess of— (i) the proceeds from the sale of an 
issue, over (ii) the issuance costs financed by the issuer (to the extent that such costs do not exceed 
2 percent of such proceeds),” including any proceeds from investing that excess, if any. I.R.C.  
§ 54A(e)(4).  
 78. “Reasonably required reserve fund” refers to I.R.C. § 148(d) (arbitrage funds) and I.R.C.  
§ 150(a)(3) (net proceeds). See IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. at 833, 835. Thus, if the reasonably 
required reserve fund exceeds 10 percent of the total sale proceeds from the issue, the bond is an 
“arbitrage bond” and does not qualify as a tax-exempt bond under § 103(b)(2), meaning that the 
bond would also not be a BAB under § 54AA. See I.R.C. § 54AA(d)(1)(A).  
 79. I.R.C. § 54AA(g)(2) (2009); see also IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. 801, 835. The 
“qualified activity bond” must also be a BAB, I.R.C. § 54AA(g), and the issuer must irrevocably 
elect to have § 54AA(g) apply, I.R.C. § 54AA(g)(2)(B). 
 80. See FY2013 EXPLANATIONS, supra note 17, at 11–12.  
 81. See 2011 TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 3.  
 82. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 200; see also Patrick Temple-West, Senator Wyden Touts 
Tax-Credit Bonds, Hits Tax Exemption for New Munis, THE BOND BUYER, Apr. 13, 2011, 
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B. BAB FUNCTION AND POLICY 
Congress’ objectives in creating the BAB program reflect the 
underlying purposes of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 
2009—promoting economic recovery by creating jobs and increasing 
government spending.83 To wit, the BAB program assists municipal 
governments finance capital projects by lowering the cost of borrowing, 
thereby helping to create jobs and stimulate the economy.84 By focusing on 
its underlying economic rationales, however, the BAB program reveals a 
more optimal approach to federal tax incentives and highlights the reasons 
for its success. In particular, the BAB program more efficiently allocates 
the federal tax subsidy than traditional tax-exempt bonds and increases 
investor demand for municipal bonds by widening the investor pool.85 
1. Efficient Allocation of Federal Resources 
“Direct payment” and “tax-credit” bonds more efficiently allocate 
federal tax incentives by greatly reducing the tax expenditure inefficiencies 
inherent in traditional tax-exempt bonds.86 Thus, to better understand how 
the “direct payment” and “tax-credit” BAB programs are more efficient, it 
is necessary to understand why traditional tax-exempt municipal bonds 
inefficiently allocate federal resources. 
By exempting the investor’s interest earnings from federal taxes,87 tax-
exempt bonds reduce a municipal issuer’s cost of borrowing by allowing 
the issuer to sell the bond at a lower coupon rate than a similarly risky 
taxable bond of comparable maturity.88 To illustrate, an investor P with a 
marginal tax rate of 25 percent would be as willing to purchase a $1,000 
taxable corporate bond with a 6 percent interest rate as she would a $1,000 
tax-exempt municipal bond of comparable risk and maturity with a 4.5 
percent interest rate because the investor’s net after tax interest earnings on 
either bond would be same. The $60 coupon on the taxable corporate bond 
will be reduced by $15 (25 percent of $60), resulting in net after-tax interest 
earnings of $45, while the investor would similarly net $45 on the tax-free 
municipal bond because its $45 coupon is not reduced by federal income 
taxes. Thus, the federal tax expenditure89 of $11.25 (25 percent of $45) 
                                                                                                                 
http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_71/wyden_tax_credit-1025513-1.html (reporting that no 
issuer sold “tax-credit” BABs during the program’s lifespan). 
 83. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 199.  
 84. See id.; see also IRS Issues Guidance on New Build America Bonds, I.R.S. News Release 
IR-2009-33 (Apr. 3, 2009), available at http://www.irs.gov/newsroom/article/0,,id=206037,00 
.html. 
 85. See 2011 TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 3–4.  
 86. See generally 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62.  
 87. I.R.C. § 103(a) (2009). 
 88. See 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 9.  
 89. “Tax expenditure” refers to money forgone by the federal government through exemptions, 
exclusions, or deductions. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON 
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allows a municipal issuer to sell bonds with lower interest rates, thereby 
reducing the municipality’s costs of raising capital. 
Yet, because the municipal issuer must set the bond’s coupon rate at the 
marginal tax rate of the “market-clearing” buyer,90 the federal tax 
expenditure exceeds the amount by which the municipal issuer’s borrowing 
costs are reduced. This results in a windfall to the investors in higher tax 
brackets because the market-clearing buyer will probably be in a lower tax 
bracket than most other investors in that municipal bond.91 To illustrate, 
assume the same market conditions in the previous illustration and further 
assume that the market-clearing buyer has a 25 percent marginal tax rate, 
just as investor P above, which would cause the municipal issuer to set the 
interest rate at 4.5 percent for a $1,000 bond. An investor R with a marginal 
tax rate of 33 percent who invests in that $1,000 bond will realize a net 
interest earning of $45 (4.5 percent of $1,000, the same interest earned by 
the market-clearing investor above) but will save $14.85 in income taxes 
(33 percent of $45). Thus, the federal government provides an additional 
$3.60 “windfall” in forgone taxes ($14.85 for investor R minus $11.25 for 
investor P) to investor R in the higher tax bracket without a corresponding 
reduction in the issuer’s borrowing costs.92 In effect, the federal government 
pays $1.32 in forgone taxes for each $1.00 given to the municipal issuer 
when investor R purchases a tax-free municipal bond. This inefficient 
allocation of tax expenditures is projected to cost the federal government 
$132 billion—or more than $26 billion annually—between 2008 and 2012 
for using tax-exempt municipal bonds to finance infrastructure projects 
alone.93 
“Direct payment” and, to a lesser degree, “tax-credit” taxable bonds, 
such as those authorized by the BAB program, eliminate the inefficient and 
seemingly inequitable94 result of the tax-exempt municipal bond system. 
For “direct payment” BABs, each federal dollar spent to reduce the issuer’s 
borrowing costs goes directly to the issuer, regardless of the market-
clearing investor’s marginal tax rate, without accumulating 
disproportionately in the higher tax brackets. This results in greater savings 
for issuers without compromising the competitiveness of the bond’s 
                                                                                                                 
TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS AND HISTORICAL SURVEY OF TAX EXPENDITURE ESTIMATES 2 
(Mar. 1, 2011) [hereinafter TAX EXPENDITURE ANALYSIS]. 
 90. The marginal tax rate of the “market-clearing” investor is determined by asking at what 
interest rate the supply of tax-exempt bonds would equal demand. See 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, 
supra note 62, at 31–32.  
 91. See id. at 34; 2004 CBO REPORT, supra note 43, at 4. 
 92. In effect, investor R in the higher tax bracket is receiving the value of a taxable corporate 
bond of similar risk and maturity carrying a coupon of $67.16 (6.716 percent interest rate). 
 93. See 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 31. 
 94. See STEVEN MAGUIRE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., TAX CREDIT BONDS: OVERVIEW AND 
ANALYSIS 10 (April 16, 2009); Manchester, supra note 36, at 1825–27; see also infra Part IV.B. 
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coupon.95 For example, a $1,000 taxable “direct payment” BAB with a 6-
percent interest rate (the same coupon as the comparable corporate bond 
described above) would produce $60 in pre-tax interest income for both 
investors R and P above (6 percent of $1,000). After taxes, investors R and 
P would net $40.20 ($60 reduced by 33 percent) and $45.00 ($60 reduced 
by 25 percent), respectively, which is exactly what each investor would 
earn if they had invested in taxable corporate bonds of comparable risk and 
maturity. The “direct payment” BAB program, however, directly provides 
the issuer $21 (35 percent of $60) for each of its payments to investors R 
and P, reducing the issuer’s interest payments to $39 in both cases.96 Thus, 
each federal dollar spent in the “direct payment” BAB program goes 
directly to the issuer to reduce its borrowing costs rather than accumulating 
in part in the upper tax brackets, shaving billions of dollars from the federal 
government’s estimated $26 billion in forgone tax revenue through the use 
of tax-exempt bonds.97 
2. Widening the Investor Pool 
Because they are taxable, BABs broaden the investor base in the 
municipal bond market by appealing to “tax-indifferent”98 investors (i.e., 
investors without tax liability). Understanding why BABs broaden the 
investor pool by appealing to “tax-indifferent” investors requires an 
examination of the typical investors in tax-exempt municipal bonds and the 
reasons for their decision to invest. 
Tax-exempt municipal bonds principally appeal to investors that would 
like to reduce their taxable income, such as high-income individuals and 
juridical persons, due to their ability to capture the windfall tax-exempt 
bonds provide investors in high tax brackets.99 Thus, mutual funds, 
financial institutions, casualty insurers, investment portfolio managers, and 
other taxpayers in high tax brackets typically invest in these tax-free 
                                                                                                                 
 95. See 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 31–38.  
 96. In this example, the 35 percent subsidy rate is generous to the issuer because the issuer 
effectively pays a $39 coupon (interest on a $1,000 bond with a 3.9 percent interest rate) rather 
than the $45 coupon it would pay under the tax-exempt regime (here, the 4.5 percent interest rate 
is set to net out the market-clearing investor’s income tax obligations). Because the market-
clearing buyer in this example has a marginal tax rate of 25 percent, the 35 percent subsidy 
overcompensates the issuer in the sense that the issuer would not be able to sell its bonds at a 3.9 
percent interest rate and remain competitive with comparable taxable bonds. This provides the 
issuer with a windfall. A “revenue neutral” subsidy rate would be set at the market-clearing 
buyer’s marginal tax rate—here, at 25 percent of the issuer’s borrowing costs—to approximate the 
issuer’s interest costs under a tax-exempt system. Most legislative proposals advocating 
reinstating direct payment BABs attempt to set the subsidy at a “revenue neutral” rate. See infra 
Part IV. 
 97. See 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at ix.  
 98. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 200; see also TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 3.  
 99. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 200; see also supra Part II.B.1.  
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municipal bonds,100 with individuals and mutual funds owning about 70 
percent of outstanding tax-exempt bonds.101 It is estimated that this 
traditional tax-exempt municipal bond market has a total size of about $2.8 
trillion.102 
In contrast, BABs appeal to a different type of investor: investors who 
do not have income tax liability or otherwise cannot take advantage of 
traditional municipal bonds’ tax-exempt interest.103 These “tax indifferent” 
investors include pension funds, university endowments, life insurance 
companies, 401(k) retirement accounts, and foreign investors.104 Thus, 
taxable BABs give municipal issuers access to the much larger $30 trillion 
conventional taxable bond market, which includes “tax-indifferent” 
investors.105 This broadened investor base increases demand and relieves 
supply pressures for municipal bonds.106 As a result, municipal issuers 
benefit from reduced market volatility107 and access to a deeper source of 
funds, ultimately reducing the issuer’s borrowing costs.  
C. BAB ISSUANCE AND IMPACT 
Market commentators have regarded the BAB program to be successful 
in many respects.108 Aside from the theoretical justifications given for the 
BAB program,109 a review of BAB issuance and the projected savings 
generated by such issuances provide further evidence of the program’s 
success. I will discuss each consideration in turn. 
                                                                                                                 
 100. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 200.  
 101. TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 3.  
 102. Id.  
 103. See Pollard, supra note 2, at 200.  
 104. Id. at 200; see also Manchester, supra note 36, at 1835–44 (describing federal taxation of 
foreign entities).  
 105. TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 3–4.  
 106. Relieving supply pressures through expanding the investor base also benefits supply 
pressure on tax-exempt bonds, reducing the issuer’s borrowing costs on those bonds as well. See 
id. at 4. 
 107. See Manchester, supra note 36, at 1827; see also infra Part IV.C.  
 108. See Wessel, supra note 14 (noting that BABs helped revive the municipal bond market and 
kept local construction projects going, reducing municipal issuers borrowing costs and broadening 
the investor base in turn); Michael Decker, Letter to the Editor, BABs Promote Jobs and 
Investment, WALL ST. J., Apr. 3, 2010, at A12 (noting that issuers’ interest savings generated by 
the BAB program is instrumental in creating and preserving jobs and promoting capital 
investment, both of which help ease municipal governments’ important responsibilities to provide 
roads, bridges, and water systems that are critical to our national infrastructure); Daisy Maxey, 
Build America Bonds Gain Advisers’ Favor – Pension Funds, 401(k)s Are Buying In, WALL ST. J., 
July 9, 2010, at C9 (noting that BABs are attractive to and are used by investment advisors for 
clients in lower tax brackets and tax-free institutional investors such as endowments and 
foundations); Dan Seymour, Volume Cranked It Up in 2009 – BABs Boost Year to 2nd-Highest 
Ever, THE BOND BUYER, Jan. 4, 2010, at 1, available at http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues 
/119_250/new-issue-volume-december-2009-1005601-1.html (noting the BAB program’s large 
and beneficial impact on municipal finance). 
 109. See supra Part II.B. 
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First, municipalities issued a higher percentage of taxable bonds during 
the life of the BAB program, which was largely attributable to “direct 
payment” BAB issuances.110 In the ten years before the BAB program, 
taxable bonds constituted about 7 percent of total municipal bond 
issuance.111 After the BAB program took effect in April 2009, “direct 
payment” BAB issuance rose to 24 percent of total municipal bond 
issuance, dropped to 16 percent in the summer of 2010, then rose to about 
33 percent in the last three months prior to the program’s expiration in 
December 2010.112 Municipalities in all fifty states issued BABs during the 
program’s lifetime, with the largest issuers being California ($37.68 
billion), New York ($20.63 billion), and Illinois ($11.23 billion).113 In total, 
$181 billion of BABs were issued during the program’s lifetime.114 
Municipal governments’ extensive use of “direct payment” BABs reflects 
the program’s economic utility and importance in the context of municipal 
finance.115 
Second, apart from saving the federal government more money,116 
“direct payment” BABs provided municipal issuers with deeper savings on 
interest obligations than traditional tax-exempt municipal bonds.117 By 
looking at their respective yields through a “fixed effects” regression 
model,118 the U.S. Treasury Department determined the present value of a 
“direct payment” BAB issuer’s net savings as compared to the net savings 
generated by comparable tax-exempt bonds.119 Specifically, to determine 
the net savings a municipal issuer of “direct payment” BABs receives as 
compared to an issuer of comparable tax-exempt bonds, one must: (1) 
determine the BAB’s yield; then (2) compute the predicted interest rate of a 
comparable tax-exempt bond (taking into account the “fixed effects” 
regression model); and then (3) apply the 35 percent direct subsidy to the 
                                                                                                                 
 110. See Seymour, supra note 108. See also Pollard, supra note 2, at 200 (noting that no “tax-
credit” BABs had been issued during the pendency of the program).  
 111. See Dan Seymour, Munis See 3d Busiest November on Record, THE BOND BUYER, Dec. 1, 
2009, at 1, available at http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/118_229/new-issue-volume-november 
-2009-1004416-1.html. 
 112. See TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 6.  
 113. See id. at 6–7.  
 114. See id. at 5.  
 115. See TREASURY NEWSLETTER, supra note 15.  
 116. For an explanation about how “direct payment” and “tax-credit” bonds provide more 
efficient federal subsidies to the municipal issuer than do tax-exempt bonds, see supra Part II.B.1. 
 117. See TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 2.  
 118. The “fixed-effects” regression model used by the Department of the Treasury controls for 
most issuer-specific and bond-specific characteristics on the date of issuance, including: (1) the 
riskiness of the issuer as perceived by the market; (2) the quality of the bond’s underwriting; (3) 
the market’s perception of economic factors influencing the outlook of the issuer; and (4) the 
maturity of the bond and its impact on the bond’s yield. U.S. TREASURY DEP’T, TREASURY 
ANALYSIS OF BUILD AMERICA BONDS AND ISSUER NET BORROWING COSTS 5 (April 2, 2010) 
[hereinafter TREASURY BORROWING REPORT].  
 119. See id. at 5–7.  
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BAB issuer’s borrowing costs.120 From here, calculate the present value of 
the BAB issuer’s net savings by: (a) subtracting the predicted yield on the 
comparable tax-exempt bond from the BAB issuer’s final borrowing 
costs;121 then (b) adjust that amount to present value.122 By way of a 
concrete example, if California issued $3 billion in “direct payment” BABs 
in 2009 with thirty-year maturities paying 7.8 percent interest while the 
market interest rate for California’s comparable tax-exempt municipal bond 
was 5.65 percent during the same period, California will have saved 0.85 
percent,123 or $25.5 million, by using “direct payment” BABs.124 Reduced 
to present value, California would save approximately $13 million using 
“direct payment” BABs, assuming a 5 percent rate.125 Using this analysis, 
the U.S. Treasury Department determined that municipal issuers saved 
approximately $20 billion, on a present value basis, by using “direct 
payment” BABs than they would have spent on comparable tax-exempt 
bonds.126 
III. LIFE AFTER BABS: ISSUER CONDUCT, PRIVATE 
INVESTMENT STRATEGIES, AND LEGISLATIVE 
PROPOSALS 
At the time of this writing, the eleven months following the BAB 
program’s expiration on December 31, 2010 has seen a highly volatile 
municipal bond market.127 In the first and second quarters of 2011, the 
municipal bond market saw steep outflows of cash128 and municipal bond 
                                                                                                                 
 120. See TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 11 n.6.  
 121. The BAB issuer’s final borrowing cost is the difference between steps (1) and (3) above. 
 122. See id. In its analysis, the U.S. Treasury also took into account the impact of underwriting 
fees. For a more complete discussion of how underwriting fees affect the above calculus, see id. at 
9–11; TREASURY BORROWING REPORT, supra note 118, at 8–10.  
 123. In this example, California’s net borrowing costs for the BABs would be 4.8 percent, 
which is calculated by reducing 7.8 percent by 35 percent. Thus, California would have saved 0.85 
percent in its borrowing costs by issuing “direct payment” BABs rather than comparable tax-
exempt bonds carrying 5.65 percent interest, because 5.65 percent minus 4.8 percent equals 0.85 
percent. 
 124. Tom Petruno, U.S. Bond Plan Lowers Muni Yields; California’s Treasurer Boosts the Size 
of a Debt Offering that Includes Subsidized Build America Bonds, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 23, 2009, at 
B2. 
 125. Here, the present value factor for a 30 year annuity at 5 percent interest is 15.3725. See 
Time Value of Money Tables, STUDYFINANCE.COM, http://www.studyfinance.com/common 
/TVMTable4.pdf. 
 126. See TREASURY ANALYSIS, supra note 9, at 11.  
 127. See Carla Fried, Gauging Those Tremors in Municipal Bonds, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2011, at 
BU13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/09/business/mutfund/09muni.html 
?pagewanted=all; Steven Permut, Understanding Recent Municipal Bond Market Volatility, 
AMERICAN CENTURY INVESTMENTS (Jan. 4, 2011), http://www.advisorperspectives.com 
/commentaries/aci_10411.php. 
 128. The outflows began in November 2010, see Gregory White, The Shocking Selloff in Muni 
Bonds That Has Investors Running Scared, BUSINESS INSIDER, Dec. 8, 2010, 
http://articles.businessinsider.com/2010-12-08/wall_street/29965743_1_muni-bond-muni-market-
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issuances at record lows.129 Yet, the latter half of 2011 saw strong inflows 
into the municipal bond market130 and low municipal default rates.131 This 
volatility in the municipal bond market has been attributed to fluctuations in 
the Treasury bond market,132 uncertainty about whether Congress will 
extend the BAB program and/or the Bush tax cuts,133 and speculation about 
whether municipal governments would be able to meet their interest 
obligations to investors.134 Amidst this market climate, municipal issuers, 
investors, and Congresspeople have reacted by engaging in questionable 
disclosure conduct, employing potentially unstable investment strategies, 
and proposing amendments to the Internal Revenue Code, respectively. 
A. ISSUER CONDUCT 
Municipal issuers’ disclosure of relevant financial information enables 
investors to better analyze the issuer’s credit risks and potential for default. 
As a result, investors place great value on timely and accurate disclosure of 
                                                                                                                 
bond-situation, remained steep through early 2011, see Dan Seymour, Mutual Fund Cash Exodus 
Continues, THE BOND BUYER, Jan. 10, 2011, at 1, available at http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues 
/120_6/-1021922-1.html, and continued through spring 2011, see Jeannette Neumann, Misery 
Continues for Munis – After Dismal Quarter for Issuance, Signs Point to Weak Investor Demand, 
WALL ST. J., Apr. 4, 2011, at C1. In total, investors withdrew an estimated $45 billion from the 
municipal bond market during the record twenty-six consecutive weeks of withdrawals ending in 
early May 2011. See Ben Levisohn, Five Reasons to Rethink the Muni Rally – Municipal Bonds 
Have Surged – but Investors Need to be Skeptical; Here’s Why, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2011, at 
B7. 
 129. See Neumann, supra note 128 (reporting that first week of April concluded the slowest 
quarter for municipal bond issuance in eleven years); see also Kelly Nolan, A Deep Freeze Hits 
Muni Market, WALL ST. J., Mar. 9, 2011 at C1.  
 130. See Muni Bond Fund Inflows Best since August 2010—ICI, REUTERS (Nov. 16, 2011, 3:15 
PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/11/16/investing-fundflows-ici-idUSN1E7AF1IZ201 
11116; Michelle Kaske, Investment in Local Governments Hits One-Year High: Muni Credit, 
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 4, 2011, 12:23 AM), http://www.businessweek.com/news 
/2011-10-04/investment-in-local-governments-hits-one-year-high-muni-credit.html. Nevertheless, 
it is worth observing that September and October 2011 inflows were still far short of total 
municipal bond inflows during the pendency of the BAB program in October 2010. 
 131. See Michael McDonald, Meredith Whitney Loses Credibility as Muni Defaults Fall 60%, 
BLOOMBERG (July 15, 2011), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-07-15/muni-default-plunge 
-belies-whitney-prediction-as-borrowers-shun-insolvency.html. 
 132. The U.S. Treasury market volatility continued following Standard & Poor’s downgrade of 
the Treasury in August 2011. See Jonnelle Marte, The Ripple Effects of the Downgrade, 
SMARTMONEY.COM (Aug. 8, 2011, 12:20 PM), http://www.smartmoney.com/invest/bonds/what 
-does-the-downgrade-mean-for-bonds-1312664759999/. 
 133. See Permut, supra note 127.  
 134. See Shah Gilani, The Looming Muni-Bond Meltdown: Profit from the Collapse—and Then 
Again from the Rebound, MONEY MORNING (Mar. 3, 2011), http://moneymorning.com 
/2011/03/03/the-looming-muni-bond-meltdown-profit-from-the-collapse-and-then-again-from-the 
-rebound/ (commenting on Nouriel Roubini’s prediction of municipal defaults in 2011); Dave 
Lindorff, Despite Dire Prediction, Muni Default Pace Slows in First Half, ONWALLSTREET.COM 
(July 8, 2011), http://www.onwallstreet.com/news/meredith-whitney-muni-bonds-defaults 
-2674137-1.html (commenting on Meredith Whitney’s prediction of municipal defaults in 2011). 
Both Whitney’s and Roubini’s predictions have subsequently been discredited. See McDonald, 
supra note 131.  
2012] The Life and Premature Death of BABs 689 
municipal issuers’ financial reports.135 Yet, municipal bond issuers’ 
disclosure practices have historically been inconsistent, intermittent, and 
incomplete,136 with some commentators observing that disclosure has 
become even worse since the sufferings following the subprime mortgage 
crisis.137 Not surprisingly, investors have become increasingly more uneasy 
about the municipal bond market following the crisis and the BAB 
program’s expiration.138 Poor disclosure practices have prompted the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to investigate cases where 
municipalities failed to warn their investors about fiscal problems, leading 
to SEC investigations of the State of New Jersey, the State of Illinois, and 
Harrisburg, Pennsylvania.139 These poor disclosure practices decrease 
investor confidence in municipal bonds at a time when municipal 
governments still face difficulties in raising capital.140 
B. PRIVATE INVESTMENT STRATEGIES 
In the volatile municipal bond market following the expiration of the 
BAB program, municipal bond investors have resorted to potentially risky 
investment strategies, including credit default swaps (CDSs) tied to 
municipal securities and private loans from the investor to the distressed 
issuer.141 With respect to CDSs, large derivatives dealers142 have developed 
                                                                                                                 
 135. See FINRA, Municipal Bonds—Staying on the Safe Side of the Street in Rough Times, 
FINRA.COM, http://www.finra.org/investors/protectyourself/investoralerts/bonds/p118923 (last 
visited Apr. 25, 2012); DCP DATA Issues New Study on Transparency in the Municipal Bond 
Market, DCP DATA (Feb. 3, 2011), http://www.dpcdata.com/html/newsid45.html [hereinafter 
DCP DATA]. 
 136. For a look at state and local financial disclosures within the municipal bond market, see 
Tesia Nichole Stanley, Note, Narrowing the Disclosure Gap: Is EMMA EDGAR for the Municipal 
Securities Market?, 7 J.L. ECON & POL’Y 91 (Fall 2010) (noting that, for fear of running afoul of 
the 10th Amendment, the federal regulatory framework for municipal securities is weak and 
results in inconsistent and hard-to-find issuer disclosure documents). 
 137. See Ianthe Jeanne Dugan, Bondholders Left in the Dark – Concern Grows Over Lack of 
Financial Disclosure by State, Local Governments, WALL ST. J., Jan. 26, 2011, at C1 (noting that 
40 percent of municipalities completely failed to file disclosure statements concerning their 
municipal bonds in three or more years between 2005 and 2009); DCP DATA, supra note 135 
(finding that issuers’ promised time for disclosure of financial documents grew to 228 days in 
2010).  
 138. See Dugan, supra note 137.  
 139. See Press Release, SEC, SEC Charges State of New Jersey for Fraudulent Municipal Bond 
Offerings, U.S. Securities and Exchange Comm., Aug. 8, 2010 (SEC investigation of State of New 
Jersey); Dugan, supra note 137 (noting SEC investigation of Illinois State); Charles Thompson, 
SEC Subpoenas Harrisburg Officials, Investigates Municipal Bond Issues, PENNLIVE.COM 
(updated Feb. 2, 2011, 11:58 AM), http://www.pennlive.com/midstate/index.ssf/2011/02 
/post_175.html (discussing SEC probe into Harrisburg, Pennsylvania disclosure practices). 
 140. See Dugan, supra note 137.  
 141. See Katy Burne, Some Banks See Profit in Muni Woes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2010, at C1 
[hereinafter Burne1] (discussing “muni CDSs”); Jason Zweig, Unwitting Angels: When Fund 
Investors Become Bankers, WALL ST. J., July 30, 2011, at B1 (discussing privately negotiated 
loans between investors and municipal issuers). See also Jean Eaglesham, Mutual Funds’ Muni-
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CDSs tied to municipal bonds in hopes to attract more buyers into a 
municipal bond market plagued by massive investor selloffs.143 Essentially, 
these CDSs obligate swap sellers (i.e., “protection sellers”) to compensate 
the swap buyers (i.e., “protection buyers”) when a municipal issuer defaults 
on its interest obligations to bondholders, effectively allowing swap buyers 
to speculate on and profit from municipal defaults.144 Market commentators 
have observed that CDSs tied to municipal bond defaults encourage 
speculators to bet on financially weakened municipal issuers, thereby 
contributing to the issuer’s financial distress and, in turn, undermining the 
stability of municipal bonds.145 Additionally, some mutual funds—which 
otherwise cannot “short” municipal bonds146—that invest in municipal 
bonds have used other types of derivatives to achieve the functional 
equivalent of a CDS tied to municipal bonds.147 In a market that has been 
criticized as being under regulated,148 the use of CDSs and other derivatives 
to bet against municipal issuers negatively affects the municipal bond 
market without providing much benefit.149 
Another potentially risky private investment strategy involves privately 
negotiated loans from mutual fund investors to financially distressed 
                                                                                                                 
Debt Prices Are Questioned, WALL ST. J., Feb. 18, 2011, at C1 (mutual funds overstating value of 
thinly-traded municipal bonds). 
 142. Such dealers include UBS AG, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch, Citigroup Inc., Goldman 
Sachs Group Inc., J.P. Morgan Chase & Co., and Morgan Stanley. See Burne1, supra note 141. 
 143. See id.  
 144. See Richard R. Zabel, Credit Default Swaps: From Protection to Speculation, ROBINS, 
KAPLAN, MILLER & CIRESI L.L.P. (Sept. 2008), http://www.rkmc.com/Credit-Default-Swaps 
-From-Protection-To-Speculation.htm; Burne1, supra note 141; John E. Peterson, Could Credit 
Default Swaps Undermine the Fiscal Stability of Municipal Bonds?, GOVERNING.COM (Sept. 
2010), http://www.governing.com/columns/public-finance/could-credit-default-swaps-undermine 
-fiscal-stability-municipal-bonds.html. 
 145. See Burne1, supra note 141; Peterson, supra note 144.  
 146. See Katy Burne, Muni Bonds, with a Derivatives Twist, WALL ST. J., Apr. 22, 2011, at C9 
[hereinafter Burne2]. “Shorting,” or “short selling,” is an investment strategy where the short 
seller borrows securities from a securities holder and sells those securities at market price, with 
the intention of repurchasing those securities and returning them to the lender at a later date. The 
short seller profits from these transactions when the short seller repurchases the sold securities 
after the securities’ market value decreases. The short seller then pockets the difference between 
the sale and repurchase prices upon returning the securities to the lender. Pursuant to the 
Investment Company Act of 1940, the SEC regulates the extent to which mutual funds may 
engage in short selling. See generally Note, Regulating Risk-Taking by Mutual Funds, 82 YALE 
L.J. 1305 (1973). 
 147. See Burne2, supra note 146 (reporting that J.P. Morgan Asset Management started a 
mutual fund in May 2011 using derivatives to achieve an economically similar effect of betting 
against municipal bonds).  
 148. See Andrew Ackerman, Reg Reform, SEC Top Agenda, THE BOND BUYER (Dec. 30, 
2009), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/118_248/regulatory-reform-1005502-1.html. 
 149. See Michael B. Marois, California’s Lockyer Seeks Leverage Limits to Curb ‘Naked’ Muni 
Swap Trade, BLOOMBERG (June 4, 2010, 4:54 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-06-04 
/california-s-lockyer-seeks-leverage-limits-to-curb-naked-muni-swap-trade.html; Burne1, supra 
note 141.  
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municipal issuers.150 While these loans could help forestall losses from 
municipal defaults, they essentially throw “good money . . . after bad” and 
may lead to potentially treacherous consequences if the practice is left 
unchecked.151 These loans are currently far from prevalent, but, according 
to some experts, could become more common as municipal bond issuers 
become more financially distressed.152 
C. LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 
In the years following the BAB program’s expiration, at least six 
legislative proposals to create some form of taxable bond—either in 
addition to or in lieu of traditional tax-exempt municipal bonds—have been 
introduced.153 While politicians have proposed eliminating tax-exempt 
bonds or replacing tax-exempt bonds with some form of taxable bond since 
1918,154 many of the current legislative proposals have not faded away as 
their predecessors have done in the past.155 In part, this resilience may be 
owing to the BAB program’s recent example of a well-functioning taxable 
municipal bond.156 Even though each proposal is unique, it is possible to 
group them into three general types. 
The first and second types of proposals would eliminate tax-exempt 
bonds and replace them with either “direct payment” bonds (where the 
federal subsidy goes to the issuer) or with “tax-credit” bonds (where the 
federal subsidy goes to the investor). Representative John Tierney’s Tax 
Equity and Middle Class Fairness Act exemplifies the first type of proposal 
and would replace tax-exempt bonds with “direct payment” taxable bonds 
with the subsidy set at 28 percent of the issuer’s interest payments on the 
bond.157 The Bipartisan Tax Fairness and Simplification Act of 2011, 
                                                                                                                 
 150. See Zweig, supra note 141.  
 151. Id.  
 152. See id.  
 153. See H.R. 992, 112th Cong. (2011) (Rep. Levin); H.R. 736, 112th Cong. (2011) (Rep. 
Richardson); H.R. 747, 112th Cong. (2011) (Rep. Schiff); H.R. 11, 112th Cong. (2011) (Rep. 
Connolly); H.R. 2495, 112th Cong. § 523 (2011) (Rep. Tierney); S. 727, 112th Cong. § 111 
(2011) (Sens. Wyden & Coats); OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXEC. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, 
BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 235 (2012) (President 
Obama’s proposal). 
 154. See Jason Zweig, The Intelligent Investor: How Long Will the Tax Break on Municipal 
Bonds Last?, WALL ST. J., May 7, 2011, at B1; see also Kevin M. Yamamoto, A Proposal for the 
Elimination of the Exclusion for State Bond Interest, 50 FLA. L. REV. 145, 166–68 n.110 (1998) 
(identifying 122 proposals between 1920 and 1943). 
 155. See Zweig, supra note 154.  
 156. See Daisy Maxey, Extension of BABs Would Lift Demand – Funds Likely to Add to Scant 
Offerings, WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 2010, at C9; Martin Vaughan, ‘Build America’ Permanently? – 
Obama Will Seek to Continue the Temporary Municipal-Bond Program, WALL ST. J., Jan. 30, 
2010, at B7. 
 157. H.R. 2495. Additionally, the Congressional Budget Office issued a report in March 2011 
recommending eliminating tax-exempt bonds and replacing them with taxable bonds carrying a 15 
percent federal subsidy payable to the issuer. See Andrew Ackerman, New Build America Bonds 
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sponsored by Senators Ron Wyden and Dan Coats (collectively, Wyden-
Coats), typifies the second type of proposal and would give the investor a 
tax credit in the amount of 25 percent of the issuer’s interest payments on 
that bond.158 
The third type of proposal, which is best typified by President Obama’s 
proposed budget for fiscal year 2013, would supplement traditional tax-
exempt bonds with “direct payment” BABs, but would lower the federal 
subsidy to a “revenue neutral” rate.159 In President Obama’s proposal, the 
subsidy rate would be set at 28 percent of the issuer’s interest obligations160 
and would expand BABs’ uses to include current refundings,161 short-term 
governmental working capital financings for governmental operating 
expenses, and financing for § 501(c)(3) nonprofit entities.162 Also, President 
Obama’s American Jobs Act would have capped the tax exemption 
available on tax-exempt bonds at 28 percent for individuals in upper income 
brackets,163 which would limit tax savings on interest earned on tax-exempt 
bonds in a way that no other proposal in this group has done. 
IV. WEIGHING OUR OPTIONS—AN ANALYSIS OF THE 
VARIOUS LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS UNDER THE LENS OF 
EFFICIENCY, EQUITY, VOLATILITY, AND 
CONSTITUTIONALITY 
Fundamental changes in the federal tax system ought to be assessed in 
light of a diverse set of criteria to best achieve an effective and principled 
decision. Thus, in analyzing the three types of legislative proposals outlined 
above, I will consider each in light of economic efficiency, equitable 
                                                                                                                 
Proposal on Tap, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 15, 2011, 6:30 PM), http://online.wsj.com/article 
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 158. S. 727, 112th Cong. § 111 (2009); see also Michael Corkery & Andrew Ackerman, Muni-
Bond Tax Break Under Siege, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2011, at C2. The tax credit, however, is itself 
subject to income tax. S. 727 § 111(a). See also infra Part IV.B.  
 159. See FY2013 EXPLANATIONS, supra note 17, at 11–12 (describing President Obama’s 
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H.R. 747.  
 161. Current refundings can be used to refinance prior public capital projects where the old 
bonds are repaid within ninety days of issuing the current refunding bonds. See FY2013 
EXPLANATIONS, supra note 17, at 21.  
 162. See id. 
 163. See Lynne Hume & Patrick Temple-West, Obama Proposal Stuns Market, THE BOND 
BUYER (Sept. 14, 2011), http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/120_177/muni-reaction-obama-jobs 
-bill-1031028-1.html. 
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principles of federal tax law, influence on market volatility, and principles 
of constitutional law. 
A. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 
In the context of federal tax expenditures, the concept of efficiency is 
best stated by Professor Edward Zelinsky’s “technical efficiency” 
taxonomy, where efficiency is measured by the degree to which the federal 
government’s use of tax expenditures achieves those expenditures’ 
underlying governmental objectives.164 In the municipal bond market, 
federal tax exemptions and credits aim to reduce municipal governments’ 
costs of raising capital needed for beneficial public projects.165 Thus, 
whether tax exemptions, credits, or direct subsidies are efficient depends on 
the degree to which the money spent or taxes forgone by the federal 
government results in a reduction of municipal governments’ borrowing 
costs. 
As discussed in Part II, the amount of taxes forgone through exempting 
interest on municipal bonds from federal income tax does not reduce the 
municipal issuer’s cost of borrowing by the same amount.166 Because a 
municipal issuer will use the market-clearing taxpayer’s marginal tax rate to 
set the interest rate on its municipal bonds, investors in higher tax brackets 
will receive a larger tax break than the issuer receives a reduction in interest 
costs.167 As a result, the taxes forgone by the federal government do not 
equal the benefit received by the municipal issuer.168 Therefore, this 
windfall received by taxpayers in the upper tax brackets, inherent in tax-
exempt municipal bonds, results in an inefficient allocation federal 
resources.169 
The first and second types of legislative proposals would eliminate this 
inefficiency by abolishing tax-exempt treatment of interest generated on 
municipal bonds. Under the first type of proposal, tax-exempt bonds would 
be replaced by “direct payment” bonds, where the federal government pays 
the municipal issuer a fixed percentage of that issuer’s interest 
obligations.170 Under this system, the federal government directly achieves 
its goal of reducing municipal governments’ borrowing costs by making 
payments directly to municipal issuers in amounts proportionate to the 
issuer’s interest obligations. Therefore, by replacing tax-exempt bonds with 
                                                                                                                 
 164. See Brian H. Jenn, The Case for Tax Credits, 61 TAX LAW. 549, 556 (2008). 
 165. See Manchester, supra note 36, at 1825; 2009 CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 1, 31, 
33. Another underlying reason for exempting interest on municipal bonds derives from 
constitutional issues of federalism, discussed infra Part IV.D. 
 166. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 167. See id. 
 168. See id.; see also Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 176–77.  
 169. See Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 176–77; Manchester, supra note 36, at 1829–33; 2009 
CBO/JCT STUDY, supra note 62, at 33–34.  
 170. See supra Part III.C. 
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“direct payment” bonds, the first type of proposal would greatly enhance 
federal tax efficiency under Professor Zelinsky’s rubric.171 
Under the second type of proposal, tax-exempt bonds would be 
replaced by “tax-credit” bonds, where the federal government provides the 
investor with a tax credit against the investor’s federal tax liabilities at a 
fixed percentage of the bond’s pre-tax coupon. While there are many types 
of tax-credit bonds currently available,172 the types proposed in the 
legislation discussed above set the tax-credit level at 25 percent of the 
issuer’s interest costs173 and would include the credit amount in the 
investor’s gross income.174 Because the tax credit itself is taxed, the 
municipal issuer must provide a slightly higher interest rate than it would if 
it were receiving a “direct payment” subsidy of the same rate as the tax 
credit.175 As a result, because the investor’s net tax savings will be less than 
the amount of the tax credit, the tax credit does not reduce the issuer’s 
borrowing costs at the same rate as the subsidy,176 resulting in a slightly less 
efficient federal tax expenditure system than the “direct payment” option, 
but a more efficient system than tax-exempt bonds. 
Under the third type of proposal, “direct payment” bonds would be an 
alternative to, but would not replace, tax-exempt bonds.177 Consequently, 
the inefficiencies of the tax-exempt system would remain, but would be 
diminished to the extent that the “direct payment” bonds displaced tax-
exempt financing of public projects. Additionally, legislation similar to 
President Obama’s American Jobs Act might reduce the inefficiencies 
inherent in tax-exempt bonds by limiting the amount of income an investor 
may claim as tax exempt.178 
On balance, replacing tax-exempt bonds with “direct payment” or “tax-
credit” bonds results in a more efficient federal tax expenditure, suggesting 
that the first two types of legislative proposals are more optimal than the 
                                                                                                                 
 171. See Manchester, supra note 36, at 1833–34. Nonetheless, some argue that even the “direct 
payment” subsidy is not completely efficient because the federal government expends resources 
on implementing the subsidy. See Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 189.  
 172. See, e.g., MAGUIRE, supra note 94, at 1–2.  
 173. S. 727 112th Cong. § 111 (2011) (Wyden-Coats proposal). 
 174. See I.R.C. § 54A(f) (2012); see also MAGUIRE, supra note 36, at 4.  
 175. See generally MAGUIRE, supra note 36, at 4; see also IRB REPORT, 2009-16 I.R.B. 801, 
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 176. See MAGUIRE, supra note 36, at 4.  
 177. See supra Part III.C. 
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upper tax brackets. 
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third type of proposal. However, it is possible that using a more limited 
form of tax-exempt bond, such as that proposed in President Obama’s 
American Jobs Act, could also result in a more efficient federal tax 
expenditure system without eliminating the traditional tax-exempt bond. 
B. VERTICAL AND HORIZONTAL EQUITY 
Although theoretical notions of vertical and horizontal equity present a 
danger of exaggerating equities or inequities if viewed in isolation from the 
tax system as a whole,179 vertical and horizontal equity nonetheless remain 
important criteria for evaluating discrete tax proposals, especially those that 
contemplate sweeping change.180 Vertical equity exists “when persons in 
unequal situations are differentiated in an appropriate manner.”181 
Horizontal equity exists “when taxation on income is applied equally to 
those with equal incomes.”182 
1. Vertical Equity 
In the clearest sense, vertical equity is violated when the tax system 
treats two taxpayers in different tax brackets differently (e.g., when 
individuals in higher tax brackets pay a disproportionately small amount of 
tax, relative to their wealth, than do individuals in lower tax brackets).183 
The tax-exempt municipal bond system most vividly demonstrates this 
violation of vertical equity. Due to the windfall tax-exempt municipal bonds 
provide investors in tax brackets higher than the market-clearing investor, 
taxpayers in the highest tax brackets receive the greatest amount of tax 
benefit.184 “Direct payment” municipal bonds, such as those proposed in the 
first type of legislative proposals, reduce the vertical inequities inherent in 
the tax-exempt system because investors in different tax brackets pay 
income taxes according to their individual levels of income, comparable to 
what they would pay on any other unsubsidized taxable corporate bond. 
Thus, “direct payment” bonds remove the windfall to the upper tax brackets 
that make tax-exempt bonds vertically inequitable.185  
Nevertheless, while “tax-credit” municipal bonds do not pose the same 
degree of vertical inequity posed by tax-exempt bonds, “tax-credit” bonds 
may still violate principles of vertical equity. For example, a “tax-credit” 
bond would violate vertical equity if and to the extent that: (1) the tax credit 
                                                                                                                 
 179. See Jenn, supra note 164, at 555–56, 558.  
 180. See id. at 554. 
 181. Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 179.  
 182. Id. at 178–79. 
 183. See Jenn, supra note 164, at 555.  
 184. See Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 179–80. See also supra Part II.B.1. 
 185. See Yamamoto, supra note 154, at 189.  
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exceeds the taxpayer’s tax liability;186 or (2) the tax credit is itself exempt 
from taxes and investors are permitted to deduct the tax credit’s value from 
their taxable income.187 Yet, the first problem may be remedied by giving 
the investor in the lower tax bracket the ability to refund the tax credit for 
cash or other value because each investor would be able to take the same 
amount of tax credit regardless of their tax brackets.188 Likewise, the second 
problem would not be vertically inequitable if the tax credits were 
themselves taxable because the amount of the deduction would be 
proportional to each investor’s tax rate. For example, legislation similar to 
the Wyden-Coats proposal does not suffer from the second problem 
because the tax credits are themselves taxable under I.R.C. § 54A(f).189 
Therefore, even if the “tax-credit” bonds found in the second type of 
legislative proposals suffer from one or both of these two problems, such 
problems may be fixed, and, if remedied, would result in a more vertically 
equitable system of federal tax expenditures.190  
Finally, even though tax-exempt municipal bonds clearly violate 
principles of vertical equity, President Obama’s American Jobs Act would 
at least mitigate such inequity by capping the amount of interest income 
otherwise excludable from taxes.191 Capping the tax-exemption on 
traditional bonds eliminates the “windfall” generated by an unregulated tax-
exempt municipal bond system and creates a more vertically equitable tax 
expenditure because all investors would be subject to the same cap 
regardless of their respective tax brackets. Thus, all three types of 
legislative proposals would increase vertical equity above the current tax-
exempt system, though the second and third types must satisfy certain 
contingencies to ensure the same level of vertical equity available in a pure 
“direct payment” system.192 
                                                                                                                 
 186. An investor in a lower tax bracket might not be able to take advantage of the full value of 
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 190. See id.  
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2. Horizontal Equity 
Horizontal equity is violated when taxpayers with identical incomes 
incur unequal tax liabilities, as would happen when one investor invests in a 
tax-exempt bond and another investor with an identical income invests in a 
taxable bond.193 Thus, the current municipal bond system violates 
horizontal equity because two taxpayers in the same tax bracket would 
incur different tax liabilities depending on whether they bought taxable or 
tax-exempt bonds. In contrast, the first and second types of legislative 
proposals—which would replace tax-exempt municipal bonds with “direct 
payment” or “tax-credit” bonds, respectively—would eliminate horizontal 
inequity because all investors who pay taxes would be taxed 
proportionately to their income.194 Likewise, even though the third type of 
legislative proposal would maintain both taxable and tax-exempt bonds, 
President Obama’s cap on tax-exempt income on traditional tax-exempt 
municipal bonds might reduce the horizontal inequity normally present in 
the current municipal bond tax system because all investors with tax 
liability would be subject to the same ceiling on the tax exemption. Thus, 
on balance, the first two types of legislative proposals would go the furthest 
in eliminating horizontal inequity, while the third type of proposal would 
reduce horizontal inequity to the extent it included a cap on tax-exempt 
interest on municipal bonds.  
C. MARKET VOLATILITY 
As we have observed in the years following the subprime mortgage 
crisis, market volatility can have a negative impact on municipal issuers.195 
Issuers’ uncertainty about future funding increases the amount of interest 
demanded by investors to account for this risk, making it more expensive 
for municipal governments to raise capital.196 Market volatility may be 
reduced by increasing demand for municipal bonds, which may be achieved 
by increasing the number of potential investors.197 Increased demand 
lessens municipal issuers’ financial uncertainty, which reduces interest 
demanded by investors, and hence, lowers the cost of borrowing for 
municipal governments.198 As seen in Part II, “direct payment” BABs 
increased and diversified the investor pool by appealing to “tax-indifferent” 
investors,199 which gave municipal governments access to the much larger 
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taxable bond market.200 Additionally, “tax-credit” municipal bonds—which 
otherwise would not appeal to “tax-indifferent” investors—could also 
widen the investor pool if such “tax-indifferent” investors could “strip” the 
tax credit from the “tax-credit” municipal bond for resale to investors with 
tax liability.201 As such, “direct payment” and “tax-credit” tax expenditure 
systems benefit the municipal bond market by helping reduce market 
volatility by increasing demand in a way that the traditional tax-exempt 
market could not do on its own. 
Yet, the first and second types of legislative proposals give with one 
hand while taking away with the other: while both types expand the 
investor base by making municipal bonds taxable, they also constrict the 
investor base by eliminating the traditional tax-exempt market.202 In so 
doing, these proposals could decrease demand, which would contribute to 
increasing market volatility and, with it, municipal governments’ cost of 
raising capital. Additionally, to the extent that the first two types of 
proposals extend the BAB program without a corresponding expansion of 
BABs’ uses, municipal issuers would be denied access to the municipal 
bond market for a number of important capital needs,203 further restricting 
their access to the capital markets. Therefore, while all three types of 
proposals would reduce market volatility by giving municipal governments 
access to the taxable bond market, this reduction would be limited to the 
extent that the first proposal would displace “tax adverse” investors and to 
the extent that both the first and the second proposals would restrict  
the uses to which municipal governments could put the taxable bonds to 
work. 
D. CONSTITUTIONALITY 
In 1895, the U.S. Supreme Court in Pollock v. Farmer’s Loan & Trust 
Co. invalidated on constitutional grounds a federal tax imposed on interest 
on state bonds.204 Commentators have reasoned that the Court used the 
doctrine of “reciprocal intergovernmental tax immunity”205 to uphold the 
federalist principle, beginning in McCulloch v. Maryland and later 
expanded upon in Collector v. Day, that both state and federal governments 
are each immune from taxes levied by the other due to their separate and 
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inviolable sovereign powers.206 Although the Sixteenth Amendment later 
permitted the federal government to tax “all income from whatever source 
derived,”207 Congress nevertheless was hesitant to tax interest on state and 
local bonds for fear of violating the federalist principles of the Constitution 
and passed the first federal income tax exemption for interest on state 
bonds.208 
Commentators now suggest that the principal constitutional concern 
implicated by a federal tax on municipal bond interest is not that the federal 
government is without the power to do so, but rather that taxing municipal 
bonds would undermine federalist principles inherent in the Constitution 
and could lead to a gradual erosion of state sovereignty.209 Framed in this 
way, a federal income tax on municipal bonds would be problematic 
because the federal government would start down a path of controlling the 
states’ power of the purse, a power that should not be exercised by the 
federal government except for compelling reasons.210 
Starting with the premise that a federal tax on municipal bonds should 
be avoided if possible, the first and second legislative proposals—
eliminating tax-exempt bonds altogether—seem at odds with the federalist 
teachings of Day and McCulloch. Indeed, commentators cite the fear that 
the federal government gains too much control over state and local 
spending through “tax-credit” or “direct payment” municipal bonds because 
investors and issuers rely on the federal government to set a fair subsidy 
rate and run the risk of retroactively losing their subsidies through tax 
setoffs or noncompliance with arbitrage rules.211 The third type of 
legislative proposal, however, would avoid treading on state sovereignty by 
retaining tax-exempt municipal bonds and offering “direct payment” 
municipal bonds to supplement the existing tax-exempt market. Finally, a 
proposal similar to President Obama’s American Jobs Act would fall 
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somewhere between the first two proposals and the third type of proposal 
because investors would not have to completely rely on the federal 
government to provide fair federal subsidies (by retaining tax-exempt 
bonds), but would begin eroding state sovereignty by limiting the amount of 
income on municipal bonds that may be exempted from taxes. 
CONCLUSION 
The years following the subprime mortgage crisis placed tremendous 
strain on municipal governments’ abilities to raise capital in the municipal 
bond market.212 Through the BAB program, the federal government 
provided municipal issuers with the option of a subsidized taxable bond to 
supplement existing tax-exempt municipal bonds. This gave issuers a 
powerful new method of raising capital213 while saving the federal 
government substantial tax revenue by delivering a more efficient federal 
subsidy to municipal issuers.214 While a number of politicians would create 
a subsidized taxable municipal bond system similar to that in the BAB 
program, not all proposals are created equally. Wholesale replacement of 
the tax-exempt market with taxable bonds may have the virtue of 
eliminating a tax-exempt system widely criticized as being inefficient and 
inequitable, but runs the risk of displacing investors from the municipal 
bond market.215 Furthermore, such proposals create the possibility of 
increasing market volatility and eroding principles of state sovereign 
immunity under the U.S. Constitution.216 To date, only President Obama’s 
proposals embrace the virtues of the BAB program—greater efficiency, 
equity, and market access—but avoid the problems associated with a 
wholesale elimination of the tax-exempt municipal bond. 
The tax exemption given to interest earned on municipal bonds is one 
of the last remaining bulwarks guarding against the gradual erosion of 
states’ sovereign power to raise capital. Thus, despite its flaws, the tax-
exemption system should be retained, albeit in a limited form, and 
supplemented with a subsidized taxable bond. As the American Jobs Act 
suggests, the inefficiencies and inequities that persist in the traditional tax-
exempt municipal bond system might be offset by limiting the windfall to 
investors in the upper tax brackets by capping the amount of income 
exempt from federal taxes. Overall, in creating a more workable tax 
expenditure system for municipal bonds, I believe that supplementing the 
traditional tax-exempt municipal bond market with subsidized taxable 
bonds, much like President Obama’s proposals, best walks the line between 
                                                                                                                 
 212. See supra Part I.B. 
 213. See supra Part II.B. 
 214. See supra Parts II.B.1 and IV.A. 
 215. See supra Part IV. 
 216. See supra Parts IV.C and IV.D. 
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upholding principles of state sovereignty and creating a more efficient, 
equitable, and stable municipal bond market. 
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